158 
S85N 


s  & 


if 


^EUNIVERS^ 
fe  I  ^>cf     ^*     o 


% 


~ 


NORTHERN    INTERESTS 


AND 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE: 


A  PLEA  FOR  UNITED  ACTION. 


BY 


CHARLES  J.  STILLE. 


Les  hommes  agissent,  mais  Dieu  les  m&ne. — Bos  SUET. 


PHILADELPHIA: 

WILLIAM  S.  &  ALFRED   MARTIEN, 

606  CHESTNCT  STREET. 

1863. 


NORTHERN  INTERESTS 


AND 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE: 


A  PLEA  FOR  UNITED  ACTION. 


BY 

CHARLES  J.  STTLLE. 


Les  homines  agissent,  mais  Dieu  les  mdne. — BOSSUET. 


^PHILADELPHIA: 

WILLIAM    S.   &  ALFRED   MARTIEN, 

G06  CHESTNUT  STREET. 
1863. 


MfftlfV 


TOll: 


TO  THE  HEADER. 

THE  writer  of  the  following  pages  proposes  to  examine 
the  probable  effect  of  Southern  Independence  upon  some 
of  the  vital  material  interests  of  the  North.  He  trusts 
that  this  examination,  while  it  may  illustrate  the  value  of 
the  Union,  will  also  show  the  importance  of  united  action 
among  ourselves  to  secure  its  permanence.  His  earnest 
desire  is  to  prove  how  intensely  practical  a  thing  Ameri- 
can nationality  is,  and  he  will  not  hesitate  to  condemn, 
with  equal  frankness,  the  extreme  views  of  either  party, 
when  they  seem  to  him  to  conflict  with  its  developement. 

PHILADELPHIA,  February,  1863. 


Copy-right  secured,  according  to  Act  of  Congresi. 


£452 


WE  have  now  reached  a  period  in  the  progress  of 
the  war  when  the  prospect  before  us,  in  one  aspect 
at  least,  is  clear  and  unmistakable.  Many  of  us 
have  been  from  the  beginning  groping  our  way 
through  mists  and  darkness,  uncertain  where  that 
way  might  lead  us,  and  fondly  hoping  that  the 
rising  sunlight  would  dispel  the  dim  phantom  of 
ill-omen  which  had  haunted  our  footsteps  during 
our  dreary  journey.  But  alas!  while  that  sunlight 
may  have  chased  away  the  phantom,  it  has  revealed 
in  its  place  a  monster  of  more  "  hideous  mien,"  pro- 
claiming in  open  and  defiant  tones  the  deliberate 
purpose  of  our  enemies  to  establish  on  our  borders 
an  independent,  foreign,  and  necessarily  hostile 
power. 

We  confess  that  we  have  been  long  in  coming  to 
the  belief  that  the  southern  people  were  in  earnest 
in  hoping  to  carry  out  a  scheme  so  extraordinary. 
It  seemed  necessary  to  deny  to  them  the  possession 
of  an  ordinary  share  of  good  sense  and  common 


538947 


6  NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

foresight,  to  suppose  that  they  could  really  expect 
to  establish  permanently  such  a  government,  or  that 
they  really  believed  that  the  people  of  the  North 
could  by  any  possible  combinations  ever  be  made 
to  consent  to  it.  This  hesitation,  which  has  been 
shared  by  many,  has  unquestionably  served  much  to 
weaken  the  enthusiasm  with  which,  otherwise,  the 
war  would  have  been  constantly  supported.  But 
there  can  be  room  for  doubt  no  longer.  It  would 
be  waste  of  time  to  examine  all  the  declarations-  of 
the  rebels  on  this  point,  but  from  the  course  ma- 
lignity of  the  Richmond  newspapers,  to  the  vulgar 
mendacity  of  Mr.  Davis's  speech  at  Jackson,  they 
all  agree  in  this, — that  the  inflexible  purpose  of  the 
leaders  at  the  South  is,  to  establish,  if  they  can,  a 
great  independent  slave  power  on  this  continent, 
and  that  to  render  such  a  power  safe  and  strong, 
every  State  which  has  the  bad  taste  or  the  bad 
policy  to  prohibit  slavery  within  its  borders,  must 
on  that  account  be  denied  any  participation  in  such 
a  government,  and  that  any  theory  of  reconstruction 
or  reconciliation,  based  on  constitutional  guarantees, 
— even  one  which  would  secure  the  services  of  the 
whole  population  of  the  North  as  slaves,  according 
to  the  Richmonol  newspapers — must  be  abandoned 
as  hopeless. 

This,  at  any  rate,  has  the  merit  of  simplifying  the 
matter  very  much.  Only  consider  how  anxiously  we 
have  endeavoured  to  find  out  the  grievances  of  the 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  7 

South  which  were  so  intolerable  as  to  justify  them, 
on  any  principle  which  has  governed  mankind  at 
other  times,  in  rushing  into  a  revolution ;  how  many 
of  us  have  tried  every  species  of  conciliation,  and 
have  promised  guarantees  for  their  future  safety,  if 
the  people  would  only  return  to  their  duty;  how 
some  have  gone  even  further,  and  presumed  to  offer 
up  New  England  as  a  sacrifice  to-  appease  this 
insatiable  Moloch.  But  it  has  all  been  to  no  pur- 
pose. The  South  has  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  the 
charmer,  "  charm  he  never  so  wisely."  The  rebels 
have  in  turn  been  bullied,  beaten,  starved,  and  beg- 
gared by  one  party;  and  flattered,  caressed,  encou- 
raged, and  tempted  with  fine  promises  by  the  other; 
but  to  each  party  they  have  held  precisely  the  same 
language — that  of  stubborn,  defiant  insult.  No; 
the  insane  pride  of  the  slaveholder  still  cherishes 
the  dream  of  that  perfect  civilization  in  which 
slavery  is  to  be  really  the  corner-stone  of  the 
republic,  in  which  every  power  which  can  mould 
the  form  of  government,  and  every  theory  which  can 
guide  and  control  its  action,  shall  be  due  to  the 
pure  and  unmixed  influence  of  the  slave  system 
upon  the  man  and  the  citizen.  Their  future  asso- 
ciation with  us  would  destroy  this  darling  theory, 
not  because  we  are  anti-slavery  in  our  opinions,  but 
simply  because  nature  and  our  position  have  unhap- 
pily forced  us  to  be  non-slaveholding.  They  glory, 
therefore,  in  being  aliens  and  foreigners,  and  they 


8  NORTHERN   INTERESTS  AND 

present  to  us  the  most  singular  spectacle  of  a  people 
saved  from  utter  annihilation,  simply  because  a  large 
party  in  the  country  with  which  they  are  at  war 
refuse  to  take  them  at  their  word. 

We  cannot,  we  wish  we  could,  refuse  the  evi- 
dence of  our  own  senses  in  this  matter.  The 
question  is  no  longer  whether  we  shall  restore  the 
Union  upon  any  terms,  or  by  any  possible  theory 
of  reconstruction,  not  even  whether  the  war  is  car- 
ried on  upon  principles,  and  with  certain  indications 
of  a  policy  which  we  may  not  all  approve,  but  it 
seems  to  us  that  it  is  narrowed  down  to  this, 
whether  our  own  permanent  peace  and  security  do 
not  require  us  to  crush  effectually  a  scheme,  which 
would  establish  on  our  borders  an  independent 
sovereignty. 

Let  us  look  fairly  at  the  portentous  significance 
of  the  project  before  us,  and  reflect  upon  the  ine- 
vitable consequences  to  our  own  safety  and  peace 
if  it  should  be  successful.  This  is  no  mere  senti- 
mental nor  speculative  matter.  It  has  nothing  to 
do  with  our  pride  in  preserving  the  integrity  of  our 
national  existence  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  nothing 
to  do  with  any  mere  philanthropic  feelings  in  regard 
to  the  condition  of  the  slaves,  but  it  addresses  itself 
to  our  deepest  instincts,  to  considerations  connected 
with  the  value  and  safety  of  our  property,  with  our 
love  of  peace,  and  with  all  our  hopes  of  the  future, 
as  those  hopes  are  bound  up  in  the  belief  of  our 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  9 

capacity  for  developing  our  natural  resources.  Every 
man  in  the  free  States  who  owns  a  dollar's  worth  of 
property,  or  who  has  the  smallest  belief  in  the  value 
of  free  institutions,  is  as  much  interested  in  the  set- 
tlement of  this  matter,  as  if  it  were  proposed  to  place 
the  territory,  which  the  South  now  claims,  under  the 
absolute  sovereignty  of  England,  France,  or  Russia. 
There  is  no  middle  ground.  It  can  no  longer  be 
disguised  that  the  rebels  have  determined  to  estab- 
lish, if  they  can,  two  separate  nations  out  of  the 
common  territory,  and  that  no  concessions  we  can 
make,  no  securities  we  can  offer,  nothing  but  the 
irresistible  power  of  a  victorious  army  can  change 
their  purpose. 

This  is  the  issue  we  have  to  meet,  plain  and 
unmistakable,  and  it  does  really  seem  as  if  it  had 
been  forced  upon  us  just  at  this  crisis,  by  the  direct 
interposition  of  Divine  Providence,  to  recall  that 
united  and  generous  enthusiasm  with  which  this 
contest  was  first  entered  upon,  and  to  rouse  into 
efficient  action  that  deep,  common,  universal  instinct 
of  the  American  heart — its  intense  nationality,  which 
has  only  been  slumbering  of  late,  because  it  feared 
misdirection.  In  the  legitimate  influence  of  this 
sentiment  is  our  sure  ground  of  hope.  Let  us  not 
forget  that  in  all  the  angry  discussions  about  the 
policy  of  the  war,  while  the  theory  of  one  party  may 
be  called  that  of  conciliation,  and  that  of  the  other, 
coercion,  the  avowed  object  of  both  has  been  the 


10  NORTHERN    INTERESTS   AND 

same — the  restoration  of  the  Union.  The  Demo- 
cratic party  has  hoped  against  hope,  profoundly  con- 
vinced of  the  inestimable  value  of  the  Union,  and 
fondly  believing  that  a  policy  of  concession  would 
secure  its  restoration.  This  is  observable  in  all  its 
public  acts,  and  even  in  the  avowals  of  those  who 
are  supposed  by  many  to  entertain  very  extreme 
views  on  the  subject  of  concession.  These  opinions 
are  only  the  outgrowth  of  that  common  sentiment  of 
American  nationality,  which  is  powerful  with  them 
in  common  with  men  of  all  parties.  That  this  na- 
tion shall  be  ONE,  no  matter  at  what  cost  of  pride 
or  principle,  is  their  inmost  desire.  No  one  con- 
spicuous in  that  party,  so  far  as  we  know,  with  a 
single  exception,  to  which  we  shall  refer  hereafter, 
has  ever  favoured  the  scheme  of  southern  indepen- 
dence. On  the  contrary,  Governor  Seymour,  Mr. 
Van  Buren,  or  Mr.  Charles  Ingersoll,  are  quite  as 
decided  on  this  point  as  Mr.  Lincoln  himself.  Mr. 
Ingersoll,  in  a  recent  speech,  remarkable  not  less 
for  the  sagacity  with  which  he  exposes  the  folly  of 
this  dream  of  southern  independence — a  theory,  as 
he  truly  says,  tenable  only  in  connection  with  a 
perpetual  war — than  for  the  frankness  with  which 
he  predicts  the  consequences,  tells  his  southern 
friends,  that  if  they  have  really  made  up  their 
minds  to  persist  in  such  a  scheme,  that  the  North, 
of  all  parties,  must  necessarily  become  a  unit  against 
them  and  their  slave  system,  and  that  their  ulti- 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  11 

mate  ruin  must  then  become  inevitable.  These  are 
opinions  which  must  sooner  or  later  be  forced  upon 
thinking  men  of  all  parties,  when  they  are  con- 
vinced of  the  hopelessness  of  conciliating  the  South; 
and  the  alternative  is  presented,  whether  we  are  to 
protect  our  own  nearest,  home  interests,  by  forcing 
these  people  to  submit  at  any  cost,  or  whether,  on 
the  other  hand,  we  are  to  allow  them  to  establish 
themselves  in  quiet  and  undisturbed  possession  of 
a  powerful  sovereignty  on  our  borders. 

For  let  us  reflect  what  this  project  of  southern 
independence  really  means.  To  enumerate  only 
some  of  the  more  obvious  results,  it  includes,  on  the 
part  of  the  North,  the  abandonment  of  Chesapeake 
Bay,  with  Fortress  Monroe,  its  guardian  at  its  outlet  ; 
the  possession,  by  our  enemies,  of  all  the  forts  on 
the  southern  coast,  including  those  at  Key  West, 
the  Tortugas,  and  Pensacola,  by  means  of  which  the 
safety  of  the  whole  commerce  of  the  North  with  the 
West  Indies,  South  America,  and  California,  would 
be  jeopardized;  it  requires  the  secure  protection  of 
a  frontier  of  more  than  fifteen  hundred  miles  in 
length;  it  places  the  navigation  of  our  great  rivers, 
and  especially  that  of  the  Mississippi,  under  such 
control  as  might  be  arranged  by  treaty  with  a  jealous 
foreign  power ;  and  more  than  all,  and  perhaps  worse 
than  all,  it  takes  away  wholly  the  power  of  resisting 
the  encroachments  of  European  powers,  who,  either 
in  alliance  with  the  South,  or  taking  advantage  of 


12  NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

its  hatred  against  us,  would  certainly  not  fail  in  any 
future  war  to  attack  us  in  that  quarter  which  these 
proposed  arrangements  would  render  wholly  defence- 
less. If  the  success  of  our  enemies  is  to  lead  to 
such  results,  we  may  be  pretty  confident  that  when 
the  matter  is  fully  understood,  there  will  be  but  one 
party  at  the  North — the  commonest  instinct  of  self- 
preservation  will  make  us  a  unit. 

Let  us  look,  then,  at  this  subject  from  a  point  of 
view  whence  it  seems  to  us  it  has  not  been  suf- 
ficiently considered.  Let  us  turn  our  eyes  away 
from  the  South,  and  forget  for  a  moment  that  the 
war  is  waged  to  restore  the  Union,  or  to  force  rebels 
into  submission.  Let  us  look  at  home,  at  the  North, 
and  ask  ourselves,  what  would  be  the  consequences 
to  ws,  to  our  peace,  security,  or  prosperity,  if  we 
should  falter  in  this  great  contest.  Let  us  examine 
the  four  great  pillars,  which  support  the  whole 
edifice  of  northern  prosperity,  so  far  as  that  pros- 
perity can  be  affected  by  the  action  of  a  govern- 
ment— the  free  navigation  of  the  rivers, — the  secu- 
rity of  our  foreign  commerce, — unrestricted  inland 
communication  and  intercourse, — and  safety  against 
foreign  invasion,  and  see  how  long  they  are  likely 
to  remain  standing,  if  this  dream  of  southern  inde- 
pendence is  realized. 

The  very  first  idea  which  suggests  itself  to  the 
mind  in  connection  with  the  notion  of  an  indepen- 
dent sovereignty,  is  that  fruitful  source  of  the  long- 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  13 

est  and  bloodiest  wars  on  record  in  modern  times,  a 
long  and  exposed  boundary  line.     We  do  not  know 
that  the  project  of  independence  is  sufficiently  deve- 
loped to  enable  us  to  say  where  the  proposed  bound- 
ary line  is  to  run ;  but  be  it  a  river  or  an  imaginary 
line,  it  must  be  more  than  fifteen  hundred  miles 
long.   If  we  follow  the  practice  of  European  nations, 
a  practice  the  result  of  necessity,  we  must,  for  our 
own  safety,  protect  the  whole  of  this  line  by  for- 
tresses.    Consider,  too,  the  constant  daily  irritation 
arising  along  the  whole  of  this  frontier,  owing  to 
mutual   jealousies,   differing    custom-house   regula- 
tions, and  more  than  all,  from  that  prolific  source 
of  trouble,  the  existence  of  slavery  on  one  side  of 
the  line,  and  its  prohibition  on  the  other.     There  is 
a  strange   theory  that  there  is  more   likely  to  be 
mutual  respect  in  the  relations  of  inhabitants  of 
independent  nations,  than  in  those  of  a  people  who 
are  kept  in  unwilling  subjection  to  the  same  rule. 
We  are  pointed  to  the  hatred  of  the  Irish  to  the 
English,  of  the  Magyars  to  the  Austrians,  of  the 
Italians    to   the   Germans;    but   if  we   will  recall 
the  feelings  of  the  Greeks   to  the   Turks,  of  the 
Belgians  to  the  Dutch,  of  the  Portuguese  to  the 
Spaniards,  or  of  the   Swiss    to  the  Austrians,  we 
shall  discover  that  the  cause  of  this  antipathy  lies 
deeper  than  a  dislike  to  a  common  government,  and 
must  be  sought  for  in  the  far  more  radical  differ- 
ences which  arise  from  an  irreconcilable  hostility  of 


14  NORTHERN    INTERESTS   AND 

race  and  religion.  History,  alas!  lends  no  support 
to  any  such  theory.  It  teaches,  on  the  contrary, 
that  "enmity  between  contending  nations  is  impla- 
cable and  venomous,  just  in  the  same  degree  as  they 
have  previously  stood  near  each  other,  or  as  nature 
intended  the  relation  of  good  will  to  exist  between 
them.  It  is  the  secret  of  all  civil  and  religious 
wars ;  it  is  the  secret  of  divided  families ;  it  is  the 
explanation  of  unrelenting  hatred  between  those 
who  were  once  bosom  friends.  Our  position  would 
be  but  the  repetition  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  or 
of  the  German  Thirty  Years'  war,  with  still  greater 
bitterness  between  us,  because  it  would  be  far  more 
unnatural."  Can  we  look  calmly  at  these  things, 
and  not  feel  that  a  war  of  twenty  years'  duration, 
which  would  at  last  teach  both  parties  that  their 
only  safety  lay  in  Union,  would  be  preferable  to 
evils  so  intolerable1?  Can  we  consent  to  owe  our 
safety  to  a  triple  line  of  fortresses,  like  that  which 
protects  France  from  invasion  on  the  side  of  Ger- 
many and  Belgium"?  or  rather  can  we  doubt  that 
the  North,  with  any  such  prospect  before  it,  would 
become  an  "indissoluble  unit,"  and  strike  down,  at 
any  cost,  and  with  overwhelming  force,  those  who 
set  up  this  monstrous  pretension"? 

If  it  were  possible  that,  from  any  motive,  or  from 
any  possible  combination  of  events  in  the  future, 
we  might  yield  to  such  a  claim,  we  would  not  gain, 
by  thus  sacrificing  our  real  interests  and  our  honour, 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  15 

even  that  poor  substitute — peace.  If  we  look  at 
the  history  of  modern  Europe,  and  seek  for  one 
word  to  define  the  character  of  the  wars  which  have 
desolated  the  continent  for  the  last  century  and  a 
half,  we  may  most  properly  call  them  wars  for  a 
frontier.  All  the  passions  which  have  driven  men 
to  war  in  the  old  world,  find  at  last  their  expression 
in  the  desire  to  obtain  a  good  frontier,  a  safe  pro- 
tection against  the  ambition  of  their  neighbours. 
What,  for  instance,  was  the  object  of  the  wars  in 
which  the  Prince  of  Orange  was  engaged  in  the 
Low  Countries,  but  to  secure  a  barrier  for  his  native 
country  against  the  power  of  France  t  What  were 
the  campaigns  of  Marlborough  but  efforts  to  gain 
possession  of  the  fortresses  of  Belgium,  and  thus 
protect  the  dominion  of  the  Emperor  of  Germany 
in  that  country  against  the  ambition  of  the  same 
power?  What  was  Frederick  the  Great's  seizure 
of  Silesia,  but  a  desire  to  render  the  frontier  of 
Prussia  safe  against  Austria  and  Russia1?  What,  in 
more  modern  times,  was  the  grand  object  of  the 
early  wars  of  the  French  Revolution,  but  to  obtain 
what  they  call  their  natural  frontiers,  the  Rhine,  the 
Alps,  and  the  Pyrenees'?  What  cost  Napoleon  his 
first  abdication,  but  his  obstinate  refusal  to  give  up 
this  very  boundary1?  What,  in  our  own  day,  has 
lost  Lombardy  tcr  Austria,  but  her  persistence  in 
interfering  in  the  Italian  Duchies,  with  a  view  of 
rendering  her  frontier  safe  against  Sardinia  1  and 


16  NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

what  has  been  the  result  of  the  war  which  grew  out 
of  these  pretensions,  but  to  make  the  French  dream 
of  a  frontier  of  the  maritime  Alps  a  reality"?  In 
the  old  and  settled  monarchies  of  Europe,  if  one 
thing  could  be  supposed  to  be  permanently  estab- 
lished, after  so  many  ages  of  strife,  it  might  be  sup- 
posed that  that  one  thing  was  the  boundaries  of  the 
respective  states.  Yet,  notwithstanding  all  the 
wars,  and  all  the  treaty  stipulations  by  which  diplo- 
matists have  fondly  believed  that  these  disputes 
had  been  finally  adjusted,  these  boundaries  become 
as  shifting  as  the  sand,  when  the  whirlwind  of 
human  passion  bursts  forth,  and  the  sword  is  made 
the  arbiter  of  the  destiny  of  nations.  The  fortresses 
which  line  every  frontier  on  the  continent  of  Europe 
are  among  the  most  suggestive  objects  which  the 
thoughtful  student  meets  with  on  his  travels. 
While  they  tell  of  religion  menaced,  of  indepen- 
dence preserved,  of  ambition  curbed,  they  are  also 
enduring  monuments  of  a  truth  which  lies  deep  in 
human  history, — that  no  nation  has  ever  been  will- 
ing to  trust  its  safety  to  the  influence  of  those  sen- 
timents of  good  will  and  mutual  respect  which  are 
supposed  to  arise  from  free  commercial  intercourse 
and  identity  of  material  interests,  but  has  felt  secure 
only  when  girded  about  with  the  strongest  physical 
barriers  against  the  violence  of  human  passions. 

If  then,  a  boundary  line  could  be  agreed  upon  in 
this  country,  it  does  not  seem  practicable  to  adopt 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  17 

the  European  plan  of  maintaining  it,  and  it  would 
thus  be  at  the  mercy  of  every  outbreak  of  the  bor- 
dering population.  Even  if  this  was  escaped,  ques- 
tions connected  with  it  would  be  constantly  arising, 
and  it  needs  no  prophet  to  predict,  that  they  would 
be  seized  upon  by  any  party,  or  by  any  ambitious 
general  of  ability,  (and  it  is  to  be  supposed  that  at 
some  future  day  the  American  soil  may  produce  such 
a  personage,  although  certainly  it  has  been  uncom- 
monly niggardly  hitherto  in  this  respect,)  as  pretexts 
to  involve  the  two  countries  in  a  general  war.  There 
is  a  vast  deal  of  practical  good  sense  at  the  bottom 
of  the  theory  of  American  nationality, — the  instinct- 
ive feeling  that  this  country  must  be  one.  Its  first 
introduction  into  American  politics  was  under  the 
auspices  of  a  very  wise  and  eminently  practical  man, 
to  whose  counsels  American  independence  owes  per- 
haps as  much  as  to  those  of  any  other  one  man — 
Dr.  Franklin.  It  is  not  generally  known,  but  it  is  a 
fact  now  well  vouched  for,  that  at  the  first  meet- 
ing of  the  Commissioners  in  Paris,  to  settle  upon 
the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  1783,  Dr.  Franklin 
proposed  that  England  should  cede  the  whole  of 
Canada  to  the  United  States,  with  a  view,  as  he 
stated,  of  preventing  the  possibility  of  any  future 
disputes  between  rival  powers  on  this  continent. 
His  anxiety  to  secure  an  early  peace,  and  the  great 
victory  of  Rodney  over  the  Count  de  Grasse,  by 
which  the  French  fleet  in  the  West  Indies  was 


18  NORTHERN    INTERESTS   AND 

destroyed,  occurring  just  at  this  time,  probably 
deterred  him  from  further  urging  this  project, 
which  had  been  a  favourite  one  with  him  at  least 
as  early  as  the  year  1778.  What  would  have  been 
our  position  now,  had  this  grand  idea  been  then 
carried  into  execution1? 

Another  problem  closely  connected  with  the 
question  of  boundaries,  and,  perhaps,  even  more  dif- 
ficult of  practical  solution  on  the  theory  of  south- 
ern independence,  is  the  enjoyment  of  the  navi- 
gation of  the  great  rivers,  which,  rising  in  the 
free  States,  run  so  long  a  portion  of  their  course 
in  the  southern  territory.  It  is  hardly  necessary 
to  say  a  word  upon  the  inestimable  value  of  these 
great  channels  of  communication  to  the  prosperity 
of  the  ten  millions  of  freemen,  who  are  now  asked 
to  hold  so  dear  a  right  at  the  sufferance  of  those 
for  whose  use,  in  common  with  themselves,  that 
right  was  originally  secured.  We  may  refer  to  it 
merely  to  remind  the  reader  that  the  free  naviga- 
tion of  the  Mississippi  river  to  its  mouth,  has  been 
necessarily  from  the  beginning  the  central  idea  of 
all  western  progress,  as  the  river  itself  has  been  the 
main  artery  along  which  has  flowed  hitherto  the  rich 
stream  of  its  happy  and  prosperous  life.  Its  indis- 
pensable value  to  all  western  developement  was 
seen  at  the  earliest  period  of  the  history  of  the  gov- 
ernment, and  strenuous  efforts  were  made  to  secure 
as  free  a  navigation  of  the  river  as  was  consistent 


SOUTHERN    INDEPENDENCE.  19 

with  the  possession  of  the  territory  through  which  it 
flowed,  by  the  Crown  of  Spain.  By  a  treaty  made 
in  1795,  a  precarious  right  of  navigation  and  deposit 
at  New  Orleans  was  obtained,  and  this  was  consi- 
dered at  the  time  as  a  most  important  advantage 
gained  for  the  interests  of  the  West.  Happily  for 
us,  France,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  Spanish  do- 
minion of  the  country,  from  a  jealous  fear  lest  Eng- 
land might  wrest  this  immense  territory  from  her, 
thought  fit  to  sell  the  magnificent  prize  to  us,  and 
Mr.  Jefferson,  with  far-seeing  sagacity,  eagerly  seized 
the  opportunity  of  acquiring  it ;  thus,  as  Mr.  Everett 
expresses  it,  "violating  the  Constitution,  but  found- 
ing an  empire." 

From  that  day  to  this,  the  value  of  this  acquisition 
has  become  more  and  more  real  and  apparent.  Into 
that  magnificent  domain,  tempted  by  the  boundless 
prospect  of  success  of  which  the  free  navigation  of 
the  rivers  was  the  surest  guaranty,  the  ceaseless  tide 
of  emigration  has  poured,  bringing  with  it  the  vary- 
ing forms  of  modern  civilization,  and  a  people  has 
grown  up,  enterprising,  active,  intelligent,  perse- 
vering, blessed  with  marvellous  prosperity,  and 
happy  in  the  enjoyment  of  all  the  arts  of  peace. 
The  people  of  the  East  have  watched  the  progress 
of  their  western  brethren  with  a  wonder  and  admi- 
ration which  has  been  shared  by  all  the  world,  and 
have  looked  forward  with  complacency  to  the  period 
when  these  great  and  prosperous  communities,  the 


20  NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

free  States  of  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi,  deve- 
loping to  the  fullest  extent  all  the  wonderful  re- 
sources of  their  position,  should  become  the  centre 
and  stronghold  of  our  characteristic  American  civil- 
ization. Can  any  one  suppose  that  this  powerful 
race,  with  such  a  career  before  them,  can  tamely 
submit  to  the  abandonment  of  this  glorious  heri- 
tage, or  can  consent  to  hold,  at  the  pleasure  of  a 
foreign  power,  that  unrestricted  commercial  inter- 
course, which  has  been  the  foundation  of  all  its 
past  prosperity,  as  it  is  the  basis  of  all  its  hopes 
for  the  future.  Certainly,  to  state  such  a  proposi- 
tion is  to  demonstrate  its  absurdity. 

The  force  of  these  truths  is  so  apparent  that  it 
has  penetrated  even  the  minds  of  those,  who,  in 
their  revolutionary  fury,  seem  to  have  forgotten  the 
elementary  distinctions  between  right  and  wrong, 
and  the  rebel  Congress,  we  are  told,  has  declared 
that  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  shall  be  free. 
In  other  words,  it  is  proposed,  when  southern  inde- 
pendence is  recognised,  to  substitute  for  the  free, 
common,  unrestricted  use  of  the  great  river,  as 
now  guaranteed  by  the  'Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  a  treaty  with  a  foreign  power,  by  which  the 
country  shall  be  equally  well  secured  in  its  enjoy- 
ment. Now,  in  the  first  place  we  may  ask,  in  view  of 
the  permanent  security  of  the  right,  where  is  there 
any  guaranty  that  a  treaty  will  be  regarded  as  more 
binding  than  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  21 

itself  which,  in  one  sense,  is  the  most  solemn  of 
all  treaties?  What  does  the  proposition  amount  to, 
when  stripped  of  the  false  importance  which  some 
persons,  who  certainly  do  not  get  their  ideas  from 
history,  attach  to  the  notion  of  a  treaty  \  Simply 
this,  that  the  country  is  to  hold  this  great  outlet 
for  her  productions  at  the  mercy  of  a  foreign  power, 
and  that  that  power  thus  holding  the  very  keys  of 
her  treasury,  may  starve  her  into  compliance  with 
any  claim  it  may  deem  proper  to  make.  But  it  is 
said,  mutual  interest  and  the  laws  of  trade  will 
settle  this  matter,  the  obvious  material  interests  of 
both  countries  requiring  unrestricted  commercial 
intercourse.  All  this  was  eminently  true  when  the 
jealousies  and  rivalries  of  different  States  in  regard 
to  the  use  of  the  river,  had  a  common  umpire  in 
the  Federal  Government.  But  alas!  this  fearful 
rebellion  has  shown  that  when  human  passions  are 
roused,  material  interests,  like  moral  laws,  are  alike 
unheeded. 

Could  we  afford  to  trust  this  precious  jewel  in 
the  keeping  of  the  weakest  and  most  pacific  foreign 
power  in  existence  ?  Its  possession  would  infallibly 
give  to  any  power  the  control  of  the  destinies  of  the 
continent,  and  what  would  it  be  in  the  hands  of 
that  brave  and  turbulent  race,  whom  Mr.  Russell 
(the  correspondent  of  the  Times)  describes  as  pos- 
sessing,— not  the  wisdom  of  the  serpent,  combined 


22  NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

with  the  harmlessness  of  the  dove,  but  "the  sim- 
plicity of  children,  with  the  ferocity  of  tigers." 

The  first  essential  to  all  successful  commerce,  is 
a  sense  of  security  arising  from  the  consciousness 
of  adequate  protection  in  case  of  need.  But  what 
safety  could  there  be  to  commerce  when  any  line 
of  policy  which  we  might  adopt,  should  be  judged 
by  such  a  population  to  be  hostile'?  And  how  long 
would  the  voice  of  justice  or  moderation  be  heeded, 
when  a  foreign  power  had  at  command  so  formid- 
able an  engine  for  our  destruction1?  No  doubt,  in 
the  event  of  a  separation,  a  treaty  might  be  framed 
by  which  the  erection  of  forts  on  the  banks  of  the 
river  might  be  prohibited ;  but,  of  course,  such  a 
stipulation  would  become  inoperative  the  moment 
war  was  declared,  although  that  is  the  only  period 
when  any  such  arrangement  would  be  of  the  slight- 
est importance  to  us. 

There  is  another  consideration,  showing  how 
impossible  it  would  be  to  secure  the  free  navigation 
of  the  great  rivers,  on  the  theory  of  southern  inde- 
pendence; and  that  is,  that  in  such  an  event,  it  is 
manifest  that  the  political  necessity  for  the  control 
of  the  rivers  to  the  very  existence  of  the  proposed 
government,  would  outweigh  any  question  of  their 
mere  commercial  value,  great  as  it  unquestionably  is. 
It  is  not  worth  while  to  argue  this  point,  for  it 
must  be  clear  that  no  government  at  the  South  could 
surrender,  or  consent  to  weaken,  in  any  way,  so  for- 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  23 

midable  a  means  of  controlling  the  action  of  a  power- 
ful neighbour.  It  would  thus  appear  that  the  only 
alternative  in  this  matter  lies  between  the  total 
abandonment  of  any  real  and  substantial  control 
over  it,  and  a  determination  that  the  right  shall  be 
secured,  as  it  now  is,  by  the  provisions  of  the  Con- 
stitution. Would  it  not  be  better,  in  view  of  these 
things,  that  we  should  fight  the  matter  out  now,  and 
settle  for  ever,  who  are  to  be  the  slaves,  and  who 
the  masters,  if  that  is  the  only  practical  alternative"? 
We  cannot  help  feeling  that  when  our  people  fully 
consider  the  proposition  to  confide  the  control  of 
the  Mississippi  river  to  a  foreign  power,  a  project 
now  veiled  under  the  thin  and  transparent  pretext 
of  a  guaranty  of  its  free  navigation,  they  are  as 
likely  to  assent  to  it,  as  to  return  to  the  practice 
of  paying  a  tribute  to  the  Dey  of  Algiers  for  protec- 
tion against  his  own  piratical  corsairs. 

There  is  a  good  deal  of  misapprehension  in  some 
minds  as  to  the  peculiar  sanctity  of  provisions  in 
public  treaties  in  regard  to  the  free  navigation  of 
rivers.  It  is  supposed  that  there  is  something 
exceptional  in  their  character,  which  gives  them  a 
more  permanent  existence  than  the  other  stipula- 
tions of  a  treaty.  This  is  so  far  from  being  true, 
that  the  principles  which  now  govern  this  matter 
were  introduced  into  the  public  law  of  Europe  as 
late  as  the.  year  1814,  when  the  doctrine  of  the 
right  of  the  free  navigation  of  the  great  rivers  in 


94  •     NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

^f  •*• 

Europe,  in  time  of  peace,  was  first  recognised  by  the 
Congress  of  Vienna.  It  is  true  that  this  is  the 
only  addition  to  the  law  of  nations,  among  the  many 
which  were  made  by  that  great  assemblage  of  Euro- 
pean diplomatists  which  has  survived  to  our  own 
day;  but  the  reason  is,  that  no  general  war  has 
arisen  on  the  continent  between  powers  mutually 
interested  in  the  subject,  (except,  perhaps,  the  dis- 
pute about  the  mouths  of  the  Danube,  which  was 
one  of  the  causes  of  the  Crimean  war,)  so  as  to  bring 
the  matter  again  into  discussion.  But  we  may  be 
sure  that  while  Ehrenbreitstein  and  Cologne  com- 
mand the  Rhine,  Antwerp  the  Scheldt,  Mantua  the 
Po,  Magdeburg  the  Elbe,  and  the  fortifications  of 
Lintz  the  Danube,  a  war  between  parties  mutually 
interested  in  the  navigation  of  these  great  rivers 
would  not  terminate  without  giving  decided  advan- 
tage to  that  nation  whose  power,  resulting  from  the 
strength  and  position  of  its  fortifications,  could  con- 
trol their  course.  We  must  not  forget  that  the 
practical  question  with  us  is,  not  how  the  right  of 
navigation  is  to  be  secured  during  a  time  of  peace, 
for  then,  as  with  the  air  we  breathe,  it  is  of  interest 
to  no  one  to  interfere  with  its  enjoyment;  but  how 
far,  in  time  of  war,  its  control  might  embarrass  our 
operations,  or  force  us  into  humiliating  concessions. 
The  question  was  settled  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna, 
as  a  matter  of  general  European  concern,  and  the 
arrangement  was  guaranteed  by  all  the  powers. 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  25 

This  is  precisely  the  position  in  which  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  stands  in  regard  to  the 
Mississippi  and  all  our  great  navigable  rivers,  so  far 
as  the  right  of  every  citizen  of  any  State  to  use 
them  as  channels  of  trade,  is  concerned.  It  has 
neither  power  nor  temptation  to  grant  peculiar 
privileges  to  any  section,  and  is  only  desirous  of 
developing,  to  the  fullest  extent,  their  great  value 
for  the  convenience  of  all.  This  is  the  only  sub- 
stantial guaranty  we  can  ever  have  for  the  perma- 
nent enjoyment  of  these  great  arteries  of  civilization, 
and  the  proposition  of  a  would-be  foreign  power  to 
allow  us  to  use  our  own,  as  its  interests  or  passions 
may  dictate,  is  a  miserable  mockery  and  insult. 

If  we  wish  to  know  what  the  great  West  would 
think  of  such  a  scheme,  let  us  listen  to  its  true 
voice,  as  it  comes  to  us  in  the  trumpet  tones  of 
noble  Rosecrans,  rousing  the  very  depths  of  the 
soul.  "We  know  that  such  a  blessing  as  peace  is 
not  possible  while  the  unjust  and  arbitrary  power 
of  the  rebel  leaders  confronts  and  threatens  us. 
Crafty  as  the  fox,  cruel  as  the  tiger,  they  cried  'no 
coercion,'  while  preparing  to  strike  us.  Bully  like, 
they  proposed  to  fight  us,  because  they  said  they 
were  able  to  whip  five  to  one;  and  now,  when 
driven  back,  they  whine  out  'no  invasion,'  and  pro- 
mise us  of  the  West  permission  to  navigate  the  Mis- 
sissippi, if  we  will  be  'good  boys,'  and  do  as  they 
bid  us.  Whenever  they  have  the  power,  they  drive 


26  NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

before  them  into  the  ranks,  the  southern  people,  and 
they  would  also  drive  us.  Trust  them  not.  Were 
they  able,  they  would  invade  and  destroy  us  without 
mercy.  Absolutely  assured  of  these  things,  I  am 
amazed  that  any  one  could  think  of  'peace  on  any 
terms.'  He  who  entertains  the  sentiment  is  fit 
only  to  be  a  slave;  he  who  utters  it  at  this  time, 
is,  moreover,  a  traitor  to  his  country,  who  deserves 
the  scorn  and  contempt  of  all  honourable  men." 

The  whole  theory  of  the  binding  force  of  treaties, 
which  it  is  proposed  to  substitute  for  the  control  of 
the  Constitution  over  the  varying  interests  of  the 
country,  and  the  notion  which  prevails  with  some, 
that  peace  and  security  are  the  better  maintained  by 
treaty  provisions  than  in  any  other  way,  seem  to 
us  very  singular,  very  great  delusions.  They  cer- 
tainly find  no  support  in  history.  We  have  only  to 
study  the  map  of  Europe  for  the  last  century  and  a 
half,  to  discover  that  general  treaties  of  peace,  so  far 
from  being  any  expression  of  the  real  interests  of  the 
inhabitants  of  contending  nations,  represent  only 
the  concessions  on  one  side,  rendered  necessary 
by  the  irresistible  argument  of  victory  on  the  other ; 
and  that,  even  in  cases  where  mutual  exhaustion 
would  have  seemed  to  counsel  mutual  concessions, 
the  slightest  military  advantage,  like  the  sword  of 
Brennus,  has  been  sure  to  incline  the  scale.  Trea- 
ties based  on  such  principles,  where  the  force  of  the 
moment,  and  not  the  eternal  laws  of  justice  and 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  21 

equity,  determine,  cannot,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
last  longer  than  the  pressure  of  that  force  remains. 

How  many  times  has  the  map  of  Europe  been 
wholly  remodelled  since  the  beginning  of  the  last 
century,  as  the  result  of  wars,  arising  from  alleged 
violations  of  the  most  solemn  treaties,  whose  pro- 
visions had  been  guaranteed  by  all  the  powers.  It 
is  a  lamentable  fact,  that  neither  prince  nor  people 
has  ever  been  restrained,  (when  either  has  had  the 
power,)  by  any  provisions  of  treaties  of  the  most 
formal  kind,  from  dealing  with  their  neighbours  in 
any  way  which  their  interests,  or  ambition,  or  love 
of  conquest  might  prompt.  The  glory  of  our  own 
system  has  been,  that  these  disputes,  which  are 
inevitable  between  populations  of  differing  interests, 
and  which,  in  other  countries,  have  been  made  the 
constant  pretext  for  war,  have  here  been  submitted 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  General  Government, 
under  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution;  and  if  that 
Constitution  is  destined  now  to  perish,  stricken 
down  by  parricidal  hands,  the  fact  that  for  seventy 
years  it  kept  the  peace  between  rival  and  jealous 
sovereignties,  if  it  did  nothing  else  for  the  general 
progress  of  humanity,  will  always  render  it  the  most 
remarkable  plan  of  government  in  human  history. 
Let  us  reflect  a  moment  upon  what  we  have 
escaped  in  this  country,  merely  of  the  evils  of  war, 
by  being  bound  together  by  a  Constitution,  and  not 
by  treaties.  Let  us  look  abroad,  at  the  fearful 


28  NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

experience  of  Europe  under  a  system  which  it  is 
proposed  we  shall  now  adopt,  and  be  thankful  for 
the  past,  and  wise  for  the  future. 

No  sooner  was  the  treaty  of  Utrecht  signed  in 
1713,  by  which  all  the  advantages  which  had  been 
gained  by  England,  in  the  campaigns  of  Marl- 
borough,  were  given  up  by  Bolingbroke,  who,  as 
the  event  proved,  while  Minister  of  Queen  Anne, 
was  also  the  agent  of  the  Pretender  and  friend  of 
Louis  XIV.,  than  intrigues  began  in  various  courts 
of  Europe  to  set  aside  its  provisions.  Spain,  under 
the  guidance  of  that  most  remarkable  man,  Cardinal 
Alberoni,  although  the  recognition  of  Philip  as  her 
sovereign  was  almost  the  only  condition  of  the 
treaty  likely  to  remain  permanent,  became  dis- 
satisfied with  her  abandonment  of  her  Italian  pos- 
sessions, and  declared  war  against  the  house  of 
Austria,  to  recover  them.  This,  of  course,  at  once 
set  Europe  in  a  blaze,  which  was  not  extinguished 
until  the  overwhelming  force  of  the  Quadruple 
Alliance  enabled  it  once  more  to  carve  up  the 
continent  at  the  pleasure  of  its  members.  Pure 
exhaustion  kept  the  nations  quiet,  until  Frederick 
the  Great,  ambitious  to  enlarge  his  territory,  not 
having  the  fear  of  treaties  before  his  eyes,  and 
thinking  that  he  had  only  three  women,  Catherine 
of  Russia,  Maria  Theresa,  and  Madame  de  Pompa- 
dour, to  oppose  his  schemes  of  conquest,  plunged 
Europe  into  a  war  which  lasted  more  than  seven 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  29 

years,  and  certainly  destroyed  the  lives  of  more 
than  a  million  of  men.  The  result  of  it  all  was 
that  Silesia  became  a  Prussian  instead  of  an  Aus- 
trian province.  So  with  the  famous  treaty  of  Paris 
in  1763,  after  another  long  war,  in  which  the  real 
object  was  doubtless,  on  the  part  of  England,  wholly 
to  destroy  the  maritime  power  of  France,  new 
arrangements  were  made  in  regard  to  the  territorial 
possessions  of  the  different  powers,  not  only  in 
Europe,  but  on  this  continent,  wholly  inconsistent 
both  with  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  of  Utrecht 
and  of  that  of  Aix-la-Chapelle.  Passing  by  the 
revolutionary  era,  and  coming  down  to  the  period 
when  legitimacy  reigned  triumphant,  when  the 
earnest  desire,  and  obvious  interest  of  the  various 
nations  combined  to  force  upon  them  all  the  neces- 
sity of  devising  some  plan  of  remodelling  Europe, 
which  would  be  permanently  secure  against  the 
encroachments  of  dynastic  ambition  or  revolutionary 
passions,  what,  we  may  ask,  has  become  of  the 
laborious  work  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  although 
the  arrangements  then  made,  with  a  view  of  secur- 
ing a  permanent  peace,  were  mutually  guaranteed 
by  all  the  powers,  great  and  small1?  Greece  torn 
from  Turkey,  Belgium  from  Holland,  Lornbardy 
from  Austria,  and  the  rest  of  Italy  quietly  taken 
from  its  recognised  princes,  and  handed  over  to  the 
house  of  Sardinia;  the  family  of  Napoleon,  with 
whom  the  Congress  had  declared  it  would  never 


30  NORTHERN    INTERESTS   AND 

treat,  and  to  exclude  whom  from  the  throne  of 
France  at  any  future  time,  had  been  the  anxious 
desire  of  all  who  signed  the  treaty,  now  firmly  rees- 
tablished in  power — what  are  all  these  events,  hap- 
pening within  the  last  fifty  years,  but  a  complete 
commentary  upon  the  folly  and  delusion  of  the  belief, 
that  any  treaties  between  foreign  powers  will  last  a 
moment  longer  than  any  one  of  them  may  have  the 
inclination  and  force  to  break  them]  Let  us  think 
of  these  things.  Let  us  be  grateful,  when  we  re- 
member that  the  Constitution  alone  has  secured  to 
us  the  blessings  of  peace  in  the  past;  and  let  us 
determine  that  peace  shall  be  maintained  in  the 
future,  as  indeed  it  only  can  be,  by  enforcing  a  uni- 
versal recognition  of  its  mild  and  beneficent  sway. 

We  have  endeavoured  to  show  the  incompatibility 
of  southern  independence  with  any  security  to  a  pro- 
posed frontier,  or  with  the  enjoyment  of  the  right  of 
navigation  of  the  great  rivers.  Let  us  look  for  a 
moment  how  our  interests  would  be  affected  by  the 
possession  of  the  forts  on  the  southern  coast,  particu- 
larly those  at  Key  West,  the  Tortugas,  and  Pensa- 
cola.  It  is  impossible  to  find  language  more  em- 
phatic in  the  expression  of  an  opinion  as  to  the  value 
of  these  forts,  in  a  national  point  of  view,  than  that 
employed  by  Mr.  Maury,  late  a  captain  in  the  United 
States  Navy.  This  man,  with  some  pretensions  to 
science,  which  he  employed  in  a  great  measure .  to 
debauch  public  sentiment  at  the  South,  by  inflaming 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE,  31 

it  with  golden  dreams  about  the  commerce  of  the 
Amazon  and  alliances  with  the  great  slave  empire 
of  Brazil,  was  ordered  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
present  his  views  on  the  general  subject  of  national 
defences.  In  an  elaborate  report,  dated  in  August, 
1851,  he  says:  "A  maritime  enemy  seizing  upon 
Key  West  and  the  Tortugas  could  land  a  few  heavy 
guns  from  his  ship,  and  make  it  difficult  for  us  to 
dislodge  him;  so  long  as  he  held  that  position,  so 
long  would  he  control  the  commercial  mouth  of  the 
great  Mississippi  Valley.  In  that  position  he  would 
shut  up  in  the  Gulf  whatever  force  inferior  to  his 
own  we  might  have  there.  He  would  prevent  rein- 
forcements sent  to  relieve  it  from  Boston,  New  York, 
and  Norfolk,  from  entering  the  Gulf.  Indeed,  in  a 
war  with  England,  the  Tortugas  and  Key  West  being 
in  her  possession,  it  might  be  more  advisable,  instead 
of  sending  from  our  Atlantic  dock-yards  a  fleet  to 
the  Gulf,  to  send  it  over  to  the  British  Islands,  and 
sound  the  Irish  people  as  to  throwing  off  their  allegi- 
ance" It  was,  as  is  well  known,  to  secure  these 
important  positions,  commanding  the  entrance  into 
the  Gulf,  and  the  commerce  of  the  Gulf  itself,  that 
Florida  was  purchased  from  Spain.  If  such  would 
be  the  condition  of  things  during  actual  hostilities, 
how  completely  should  our  policy  in  time  of  peace 
be  governed  by  considerations  as  to  the  safety  of  our 
foreign  commerce  with  half  the  world,  which  these 
strongholds  in  the  hands  of  an  enemy  might  com- 


32  NORTHERN   INTERESTS  AND 

pletely  destroy.  There  is  no  need  of  statistics  here. 
The  most  unobservant  is  forced  to  ask,  what  is  to 
become  of  the  commerce  of  our  great  maritime  cities, 
and  of  the  thousand  interests  which  are  bound  up 
with  it,  in  such  an  event"?  Let  us  learn  wisdom  from 
the  example  of  other  nations  in  this  matter.  Eng- 
land, as  is  well  known,  at  the  termination  of  all  the 
great  wars  in  Europe,  has  steadily  refused  any  terri- 
torial acquisitions  on  that  continent,  preferring  the 
possession  of  certain  strongholds  in  different  quarters 
of  the  globe,  which  would  enable  her  to  maintain  in 
every  quarter  her  commercial  supremacy,  and  thus 
effectually  control  the  policy  of  the  world  where  her 
own  peculiar  interests  were  likely  to  be  affected. 
Gibraltar,  Corfu,  Malta,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope, 
Aden,  Singapore,  Hong-Kong,  Jamaica,  Bermuda, 
Halifax,  what  are  these  but  a  standing  menace  to 
other  powers,  that  her  commercial  supremacy  is  to  be 
maintained  in  all  quarters,  at  all  hazards?  It  is 
barely  conceivable  that  any  government  we  might 
have  at  the  North,  under  any  future  combination  of 
events,  would  dare  voluntarily  to  abandon  these  great 
safeguards  of  our  commerce.  To  such  a  suggestion, 
the  only  answer  could  be  that  of  Mr.  Pitt  to  the 
Spanish  negotiators  of  the  treaty  of  1763,  who  asked 
England  to  give  up  some  trumpery  claim  about 
curing  fish  on  the  coast  of  Newfoundland,  and  were 
told  that  the  minister  would  not  dare  to  do  it,  even 
if  the  Spaniards  were  in  possession  of  the  Tower  of 


.      SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  33 

London.  These  positions  are  of  course  just  as  im- 
portant to  the  South  as  they  are  to  us,  for  without 
them  the  South  could  have  no  real  independence. 
We  hold  them  now,  and  while  their  possession,  with 
that  of  so  many. other  vital  points,  convinces  every 
thoughtful  man  how  much  real  progress  we  have 
made  in  the  course  which,  if  persisted  in,  must 
sooner  or  later  bring  our  enemies  to  reason,  we  are 
not  likely  to  forego  the  present  or  future  advantage 
which  their  possession  gives  us. 

Our  capacity  for  successful  resistance,  in  case  of  a 
foreign  invasion,  is  a  subject  closely  linked  with  our 
material  prosperity,  and  it  would  be  vastly  dimin- 
ished by  the  establishment  of  southern  indepen- 
dence. All  our  arrangements  for  national  defence 
have  been  made  on  the  assumption  of  the  perpetual 
Union  of  the  country.  To  what  a  condition  would 
we  be  reduced  in  our  controversies  with  a  foreign 
maritime  power,  should  such  a  power  be  in  posses- 
sion of  the  forts  on  the  southern  coast,  and  .of 
Fortress  Monroe  in  particular.  We  may  rest  assured 
that  the  very  first  step  by  which  a  foreign  power 
would  attempt  to  enforce  its  pretensions,  in  any 
future  disputes  with  this  country,  would  be  an 
alliance  with  the  South.  Our  disunion  would  then 
have  produced  its  bitterest  fruits,  for  we  should  have 
the  sad  spectacle  of  a  family  strife,  in  which  any 
gain  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  a  stranger.  The 
utter  inability  of  the  South  to  maintain  herself  as 


34  NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

a  maritime  power,  and  her  most  probable  enemy 
being  one  of  the  chief  naval  powers  of  the  world, 
would   necessarily  force  her  in  the  end  to    throw 
herself  into  the  arms  of  some  European  nation  for 
protection  and  safety.      It  does   not   conflict  with 
this  theory,  that  the  South  may  be  strong  enough  to 
achieve   her  independence,  because   the  efforts   by 
which  that  independence  is  gained,  if   it  is  ever 
gained,  must  necessarily  be  exceptional,  and  cannot 
be   repeated;    any   government,   even    that   of  the 
Prince  of  darkness  himself,  being  preferable,  as  a 
permanent  system,  to  the   rule  which  has  existed 
there  for  the  last  two  years.     We,  in  Pennsylvania, 
have  a  very  near  interest  in  this  matter.     We  can- 
not forget  that  on  the  two  occasions  in  which  our 
territory  has  been  threatened  with  invasion  by  a 
foreign  power,  the  enemy  approached  us   through 
Chesapeake    Bay.       Those    who    have    heedlessly 
thought,  that  for  the  sake  of  peace  the  South  might 
be  permitted  to  go,  taking  with  it  everything  below 
a  certain  line,  without  injury  to  us,  would  do  well 
to  remember  the  battle  of  Brandywine,  the  conse- 
quent occupation  of  Philadelphia,  and  the  winter  at 
Valley  Forge — the  darkest  hour  of  the  Revolution; 
nor  should  they  forget  that  other  projected  invasion 
which  we  escaped,  because  its  force  was  stayed  by 
the  victories  at  North  Point  and  Fort   McHenry; 
and   that  both  of  these   invasions  were  attempted 
because  the  Chesapeake  was  then,  what  it  is  pro- 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  35 

posed  to  make  it  again,  by  our  own  act,  an  open 
highway  for  such  an  enterprise. 

We  might  thus  go  on  enumerating  a  vast  array  of 
exclusively  northern  interests  which  would  be  inevi- 
tably stricken  down  by  the  establishment  of  southern 
independence.  But  they  all  cluster  round  the  four 
main  supports  of  our  whole  system,  which  we  have 
examined,  and  we  trust  that  enough  has  been  said 
to  make  it  apparent  that  any  hope  of  a  permanent 
peace,  the  security  of  our  property,  our  capacity  for 
developing  our  natural  resources,  and  our  ability  to 
make  ourselves  strong  at  home  and  respected  abroad, 
depend  upon  our  united  determination  to  crush  for- 
ever any  such  project.  These  truths  have  long 
appeared  so  self-evident  to  us,  that  we  have  sought 
with  no  little  curiosity  to  discover  by  what  means 
any  northern  man  proposed  to  reconcile  the  obvious 
conflict  of  the  interests  of  every  one  of  his  own 
countrymen  with  this  scheme  of  southern  indepen- 
dence. We  have  never  seen  the  propriety  of  recog- 
nising the  South  as  a  foreign  power,  so  far  as  we  can 
remember,  advocated  in  print  by  a  northern  man, 
except  in  a  recent  production  of  Mr.  William  B. 
Reed;  and  although  Mr.  Reed  concerns  himself  very 
little  with  the  peculiar  interests  of  his  own  country- 
men, whom  he  seems  to  regard  with  a  strange  con- 
tempt, yet  he  does  favour  recognition  as  a  certain 
mode  of  securing  a  desirable  peace.  There  are  many 
things  in  this  pamphlet  of  which  we  cannot  trust 
3 


36  NORTHERN    INTERESTS   AND 

ourselves  to  speak  as  we  feel,  and  we  refer  to  it  now 
merely  to  show  the  unsatisfactory  mode  in  which 
Mr.  Reed  disposes  of  the  all-important  questions  of 
boundaries  and  the  right  of  navigation.*  In  regard 
to  the  first,  the  only  mode  of  settlement  proposed, 
"  the  only  conceivable  mode,"  is  to  allow  each  State 
to  settle  the  matter  for  itself.  Kentucky  and  Mary- 
land are  to  be  permitted  to  secede  without  any 
reference  to  their  constitutional  relations  to  our- 
selves, supposing  that  political  entity,  called  the 
United  States,  still  to  survive;  or  to  the  injury 
which  their  action  might  inflict  upon  our  most 
obvious  material  interests,  supposing  their  territory, 
in  the  event  of  a  dissolution,  essential  to  the  safety 
and  security  of  the  North.  So  in  regard  to  the 
other ;  the  navigation  of  the  rivers  is  to  be  left  with 
the  "States  concerned;"  that  is,  a  foreign  country 
controlling  their  course  and  outlet,  we  are  to  be 
satisfied  that  in  peace  and  war  that  control  will 
always  be  exercised  with  the  most  exact  and  jealous 
regard  to  our  rights  and  interests.  If  we  do  not 
assent  to  this  peaceful  mode  of  yielding  up  our  most 
vital  interests,  then  we  are  threatened  with  an 

*  We  differ  from  Mr.  Reed  in  many  things,  but  we  cordially  join  him  in 
his  protest  against  dragging  the  private  life  and  personal  motives  of  our 
opponents  into  the  arena  of  bitter  party  strife.  Many,  in  these  unhappy 
days,  have  reached  conclusions  directly  opposite  to  those  of  Mr.  Reed, 
through  a  path  of  duty  beset  with  sore  trials  ;  and  their  remembrance  of 
the  sacrifices  they  have  made  of  life-long  friendships,  and  even  of  tenderer 
ties,  is  too  fresh  to  permit  them  to  judge,  with  indiscriminate  harshness, 
the  motives  of  those  who  may  not  agree  with  them. 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  37 

aggressive  war,  to  compel  us  to  do  so;  a  war  the 
horror  of  which  is  to  be  aggravated  by  a  fierce  strife 
among  ourselves,  one  party  being  supposed  to  be  in 
arms  for  the  purpose  of  purchasing  the  poor  privi- 
lege of  joining  the  Confederacy,  into  whose  blessed 
fellowship  we  are  now  told  we  may  not  come  even 
as  slaves.  What  is  all  this,  but  a  most  extraordinary 
and  characteristic  commentary  upon  the  peaceful 
mode  of  settling  the  business'?  Everything  the 
South  wants,  as  a  matter  of  taste  or  of  interest,  must 
be  yielded,  or  we  must  give  it  up  at  the  sword's 
point;  but  we  are  to  strike  neither  for  the  Constitu- 
tion, which  is  set  at  naught,  nor  for  the  preservation 
of  those  interests  of  which  it  is  the  only  guaranty, 
when  they  are  imperilled  by  the  arrogant  pretensions 
of  the  rebellion.  Mr.  Reed  is  certainly  too  accom- 
plished a  student  of  history,  not  to  know  that  such 
vital  questions  as  those  of  boundaries,  and  the  right 
of  navigation,  were  never  settled  in  this  way.  The 
appeal  has  been  made  to  force,  and  force  only  can 
decide  it,  and  that  decision,  when  the  people  of  the 
North  are  not  misled  and  deluded  by  these  vain 
promises  of  peace,  cannot  for  a  moment  be  doubted. 
Mr.  Reed  points  us  to  Mr.  Pitt's  opposition  to 
the  war  of  the  Revolution.  It  is  certainly  not  a 
little  amusing  to  find  the  man  who  had  so  intense 
a  hatred  of  the  claim  of  any  nation  to  govern 
itself,  as  to  arm  the  whole  of  Europe  against 
France,  and  to  carry  on  a  war  from  the  prompt- 


38 

ings  of  that  hatred,  which  no  one  now  denies 
was  "accursed,  wicked,  barbarous,  cruel,"  and  the 
rest, — it  is  singular,  we  say,  to  find  such  a  man 
held  up  as  the  opponent  of  the  American  war, 
upon  any  principle  which  can  find  favour  with  us. 
The  truth  is,  Mr.  Pitt  was  seeking  for  office  in 
1781,  and  during  the  French  Revolution  he  was 
wielding  despotic  power.  In  what  striking  contrast 
is  this  miserable  shifting  of  political  principle  with 
the  last  grand  scene  of  the  public  life  of  Mr.  Pitt's 
illustrious  father,  the  great  Earl  of  Chatham!  He 
had  been  the  early  friend  of  the  colonists,  and  the 
earnest  advocate  of  their  claims,  so  long  as  the  advo- 
cacy of  those  claims  was  consistent  with  the  alle- 
giance which  he  owed  his  sovereign.  He  came  to 
the  House  of  Lords,  for  the  last  time,  a  dying  man. 
"Yet  never,"  says  the  historian,  "was  seen  a  figure 
of  more  dignity ;  he  appeared  like  a  being  of  a  supe- 
rior species."  He  took  his  hand  from  his  crutch, 
and  raised  it,  lifting  his  eyes  towards  heaven,  and 
said:  "I  thank  God  that  I  have  been  enabled 
to  come  here  this  day.  I  am  old  and  infirm,  have 
one  foot, — more  than  one  foot — in  the  grave.  I  am 
risen  from  my  bed,  to  stand  up  in  the  cause  of  my 
country."  He  gave  the  whole  history  of  the  Ameri- 
can war,  detailing  the  measures  to  which  he  had 
objected,  and  the  evil  consequences  which  he  had 
foretold.  He  then  expressed  his  indignation  at  the 
idea,  which  he  had  heard  had  gone  forth,  of  yield- 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  39 

ing  up  the  sovereignty  of  America;  he  called  for 
vigorous  and  prompt  exertion;  he  rejoiced  that  he 
was  still  alive  to  lift  up  his  voice  against  the  first 
dismemberment  of  this  ancient  and  most  noble  mon- 
archy. Well  may  the  historian  add:  "Who  does 
not  feel  that,  were  the  choice  before  him,  he  would 
rather  live  that  one  triumphant  hour  of  pain  and 
suffering,  than  through  the  longest  career  of  thriv- 
ing and  successful  selfishness."* 

The  practical  conclusions  to  which  all  the  conside- 
rations we  have  urged,  point,  are,  that  the  rebel  theory 
of  independence  necessarily  makes  certain  claims 
which  are  inconsistent  not  only  with  our  security,  but 
with  our  national  existence,  with  the  safety  of  our 
homes,  and  the  enjoyment  of  our  property,  that  these 
claims  are  practically  exclusive  in  their  character,  and 
that  as  any  compromise  or  arrangement,  such  as  is 
provided  by  the  Constitution,  is  wholly  rejected  by 
one  party,  and  as  we  cannot  depend  upon  the  force 
of  treaties  permanently  to  guarantee  a  satisfactory 
settlement,  nothing  is  left  but  an  appeal  to  force,  to 
decide  who  shall  control  the  great  elementary  condi- 
tions of  national  life  on  this  continent.  The  appeal 
being  thus  made,  the  nature  and  character  of  the 
settlement  depend  entirely  upon  the  measure  of  the 
success  of  our  arms.  This,  as  we  have  shown  by 

*  Lord  Chatham's  example  illustrates  another  matter :  While  he  man- 
fully supported  a  war  which  he  had  earnestly  sought  to  prevent,  he  did 
not  hesitate  to  denounce  most  bitterly  one  of  the  means  used  by  the  Min- 
istry to  prosecute  that  war,  namely,  the  employment  of  Indians  as  allies. 


40  NORTHERN  INTERESTS  AND 

historical  examples,  is  the  experience  of  all  nations. 
It  betrays  a  gross  ignorance  of  human  nature  to 
suppose  that  sitting  down  quietly,  and  offering 
terms  of  peace,  which  are  prompted  by  a  desire  for 
conciliation,  will  ever  cause  the  South  to  yield  her 
haughty  pretensions  to  independence.  All  such 
overtures  are  looked  upon  as  so  many  evidences  of 
weakness,  and  as  was  to  be  expected,  their  authors 
have  been  treated  with  contempt  and  derision.  The 
South  is  under  no  such  delusion,  as  some  of  our  good 
people  here,  as  to  a  pacific  settlement.  They  know 
they  are  striving  to  gain  what  is  just  as  important  to 
us,  as  it  is  to  them,  and  in  such  a  contest  they  know 
that  the  sword  must  be  the  only  arbiter.  If,  then, 
these  interests  which  we  have  discussed,  are  so  essen- 
tial to  the  North,  and  if  they  cannot  co-exist  with 
southern  independence,  then  we  must  fight  it  out 
until  some  hope  of  a  reasonable  settlement  rises  out 
of  the  fortunes  of  war.  The  result  of  the  war  in  the 
end,  if  we  remain  united,  is  of  course  a  foregone 
conclusion,  and  with  the  hope  of  preserving  that 
unity  of  action  which  must  result,  sooner  or  later,  in 
an  irresistible  power,  we  have  endeavoured  to  show 
how  the  common  interest  of  every  northern  man  is 
bound  up  in  'the  result. 

May  we  venture,  in  an  earnest  spirit  of  concilia- 
tion, to  make  a  few  suggestions  to  each  of  the  great 
parties  which  now  divide  the  country,  and  whose 
concord  in  this  matter  is  so  essential"? 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  41 

The  position  of  the  Democratic  party  at  this  crisis 
is  one  of  great  responsibility.  So  far  as  we  can  now 
judge,  the  practical  solution  of  the  matter  is  likely 
to  fall  into  their  hands,  they  probably  holding  the 
majority  in  the  next  Congress.  While  we  have  full 
confidence  in  their  anxiety  to  preserve  our  nation- 
ality, our  fear  is,  that  in  their  desire  for  peace,  they 
may  be  led  into  concessions  which  may  weaken  us, 
and  not  accomplish  the  object  for  which  they  seek. 
They  should  never  forget,  in  all  their  measures,  that 
already  we  hold  positions  in  the  southern  territory 
which,  with  the  blockade  of  their  coasts,  the  posses- 
sion of  the  forts,  and  of  the  outlet  of  the  Mississippi, 
must  practically  settle  the  matter  in  the  end  in  our 
favour,  even  if  we  confine  ourselves  to  maintaining 
these  positions  without  advancing  a  single  step  fur- 
ther. We  keep  what  we  take,  at  any  rate,  whereas 
the  aggressive  war  policy  of  the  South  has  been,  so 
far,  a  miserable  failure.  Now,  it  is  hardly  to  be 
supposed,  that  the  Democratic  party  could  go  before 
the  people  of  the  North,  and  ask  their  consent  to 
the  abandonment  of  such  advantages.  They  are  not 
likely  to  forget,  that  in  a  very  dark  hour  of  the  war 
of  1812,  happily  for  them  as  supporters  of  that  war, 
news  came  that  England,  who  had  expressed  great 
anxiety  for  peace,  proposed  as  the  basis  of  a  treaty, 
to  prohibit  us  from  fortifying  our  northern  frontier, 
and  from  keeping  a  naval  force  on  the  great  lakes, 
while  a  right  of  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  should 


42  NORTHERN    INTERESTS   AND 

be  secured  to  her,  and  that  these  monstrous  preten- 
sions, when  they  become  known,  united  the  whole 
people  in  favour  of  the  further  prosecution  of  a  war, 
which  had  been  quite  as  bitterly  opposed  as  that  in 
which  we  are  now  engaged.  The  time  has  not  yet 
come  for  the  application  of  the  peaceful  theories  of 
settlement  by  which  the  Democratic  party  hope  to 
heal  our  present  troubles.  That  time  will  assuredly 
come,  if  they  are  not  too  impatient;  and  if  they 
show  to  the  South  an  united  front,  teaching  them  by 
that  sternest  of  all  masters — the  fate  of  war — to 
whose  inexorable  logic  we  must  all  in  the  end  bow, 
that  their  choice  is  between  safety  within  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Constitution,  and,  at  the  best,  the  bar- 
ren sceptre  of  a  worthless,  because  short-lived  and 
merely  nominal  independence. 

With  the  same  anxious  desire  for  conciliation, 
and  with  equal  frankness,  we  propose  to  make  a  few 
suggestions  to  the  party  now  in  power.  Is  it  not 
manifest  that  our  hopes  for  success  in  this  war 
depend  practically,  not  upon  our  waging  it  in  such  a 
way  as  to  produce  a  conviction  that  its  real  object 
is  to  remove  an  evil,  which,  however  great,  is  not 
likely  to  rouse  any  general  enthusiasm  at  the  North 
for  its  destruction,  but  rather  upon  our  finding  some 
policy,  no  matter  what  it  is  for  the  moment,  upon 
which  we  can  all  be  united  1  Was  not  this  policy 
most  unexpectedly  revealed  to  us  after  the  fall  of 
Sumter,  and  did  not  the  unity  then  happily  estab- 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  43 

lished,  receive  the  unanimous  recognition  of  the 
present  Congress  in  July  1861]  Have  we  not 
become  weaker  just  in  proportion  as  we  have  wan- 
dered from  the  great,  broad,  catholic,  policy  then 
announced]  Whatever  may  be  the  effect  of  the 
policy  of  the  proposed  emancipation  of  the  negroes 
upon  the  strength  of  the  military  resources  of  the 
South,  and  we  do  not  believe  that  it  will  be  favour- 
able to  us,  is  not  one  thing  certain,  that  at  the 
North,  this  policy  as  a  military  measure,  (and  this  is 
of  course,  the  only  ground  upon  which  it  can  be 
justified,)  has  produced  most  disastrous  results]  With 
a  view  to  the  restoration  of  the  Union,  have  we  any 
right  to  regard  those  in  rebellion  as  aliens  and 
foreigners,  because  they  choose  to  call  themselves 
such]  While  there  is  no  instance  in  modern  his- 
tory in  which  a  formidable  insurrection  has  been 
suppressed  save  by  force,  is  there  an  instance  in 
which  the  crushing  power  of  military  success  has 
not  been  accompanied  by  the  fullest  promise  of 
amnesty,  a  complete  recognition  of  the  rights,  civil 
and  religious,  of  the  inhabitants,  and  a  guaranty  of 
the  absolute  security  of  the  property  of  those  who 
laid  down  their  arms]  We  venture  to  make  these 
suggestions  because  we  feel  that  the  real  obstacles 
to  the  successful  termination  of  this  war  are  to  be 
found,  not  so  much  in  the  means  of  defence  pos- 
sessed by  the  rebels,  as  in  the  divisions  which  the 
adoption  of  these  new  and  doubtful  theories  intro- 


K 


^ 


44  NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

duce  among  us.  The  only  test  of  any  measure,  just 
now,  it  seems  to  us,  should  be,  how  will  it  affect  our 
military  operations'?  and  where  any  policy,  however 
promising  it  may  look  as  a  theory,  is  new  and 
untried,  and  must  inevitably  divide  us,  then  it  should 
be  abandoned. 

There  are  many  loyal  but  desponding  people  who, 
impatient  of  final  results,  forget  to  look  at  the  pro- 
gress we  have  already  made  towards  the  attainment 
of  our  object.  Our  enemies  understand  this  better 
than  ourselves,  and  the  Richmond  Examiner  only 
echoes  the  opinion  of  unprejudiced  observers  abroad, 
when  it  says  that  another  such  year  of  progress,  and 
the  Confederacy  is  doomed.  "The  Yankees  keep 
all  they  take," — this  is  the  true  expression  of  our 
real  strength,  and  their  relative  weakness.  Look 
for  a  moment  at  the  position  of  the  South,  as  com- 
pared with  that  of  France  in  the  invasion  of  1814. 
Her  enemies  were  mighty  in  number,  but  their 
armies  were  made  up  of  men  who  had  been  con- 
stantly defeated  by  the  French  in  the  battles  of  the 
previous  twenty  years.  She  was  surrounded  by  sea 
and  land,  as  the  South  is,  but  the  invaders  had  not 
the  advantages  we  possess,  of  holding,  in  the  heart 
of  the  enemy's  country,  most  important  strategical 
points,  and  the  great  lines  of  communication;  yet 
did  any  one  hope  that  even  the  mighty  genius  of 
Napoleon,  never  more  conspicuous  than  it  was  in 
that  campaign,  could  save  France  from  final  defeat 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  45 

against  such  odds'?  The  result  in  the  end,  we  can- 
not repeat  it  too  often,  is  a  simple  question  of 
endurance;  although  if  we  were  to  settle  to-morrow 
with  the  South,  on  the  basis  of  the  uti  possidetis — 
keeping  only  what  we  now  hold — their  independence 
as  a  nation  would  be  a  very  unsubstantial  shadow. 
Look  once  more  at  the  English  experience.  From 
January  1807,  to  July  1809,  eighteen  months,  Eng- 
lish expeditions  of  importance  met  with  failures, 
more  or  less  disastrous,  at  Constantinople,  at  Rosetta, 
at  the  Island  of  Capri,  at  Buenos  Ayres,  and  at 
Walcheren.  They  lost  the  battle  of  Talavera,  and 
Sir  John  Moore's  army  was  driven  out  of  Spain. 
The  only  successes  gained  by  the  English  in  Europe 
during  these  eighteen  months,  either  military  or 
naval,  were  the  capture  of  Copenhagen,  Lord  Coch- 
rane's  brilliant  victory  over  the  French  fleet  in 
Basque  Roads,  and  two  battles  in  Portugal.  But  the 
first  of  these  events  made  Denmark  and  Russia  open 
enemies  to  England,  and  Wellington's  victories  were 
rendered  valueless  by  the  subsequent  retreat  from 
Talavera.* 

*  The  want  of  elasticity  in  the  American  character  is  certainly  very 
remarkable.  At  one  time,  according  to  the  newspapers,  every  movement 
was  a  victory;  and  at  another,  when  these  "organs  of  public  opinion" 
were  in  a  different  mood,  events  which  have  proved  really  our  most  impor- 
tant successes,  were  looked  upon  either  as  indecisive  battles  or  as  failures. 
There  are  some  people  even  now,  who  are  not  willing  to  believe  that  Antie- 
tam,  which  completely  destroyed  the  unbounded  hopes  of  the  rebels  in 
the  success  of  an  aggressive  war,  was  a  victory.  We  are  obliged  to  learn 
from  intercepted  despatches,  that  the  battle  of  Perryville,  which  at  one 
blow  delivered  the  whole  of  Kentucky,  was  a  disaster  to  the  South ;  and 
we  find  even  the  General-in-Chief  telegraphing  to  Rosecrans  that  the 


46  NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

There  are  some  who  fear  that  the  disorganizing 
spirit  which  has  manifested  itself  in  certain  parts  of 
the  country,  may  in  the  end  penetrate  to  the  army, 
and  there  produce  disastrous  results.  We  confess 
that  we  have  too  high  an  opinion  of  the  intelligence 
of  our  soldiers,  and  too  profound  a  conviction  of  the 
deliberate  earnestness  with  which  most  of  them  have 
entered  upon  this  contest,  to  entertain  any  such 
apprehensions.  Brave  men  have  an  instinctive 
hatred  of  traitors  and  cowards,  and  are  quite  pre- 
pared both  for  the  fire  of  the  open  enemy,  and  for 
that  of  the  more  insidious  foe  "in  the  rear."  Our 
soldiers  are  fighting  for  an  idea, — the  sacred  idea  of 
country,  and  are  not  to  be  drawn  aside  from  pressing 
onwards  to  the  end,  because  some  of  the  means 
adopted  by  the  government  may  be  distasteful  to 
them.  Certainly  the  most  ungracious  aspect  which 
the  disloyal  opposition  to  the  government  presents, 
finding  fault  with  everything  that  is  done,  because 
some  great  mistakes  may  have  been  made,  is  the 

rebel  accounts  confirm  his  own  report  of  his  victory.  How  differently 
they  manage  such  things  in  France !  Here  is  part  of  a  song  which  was 
written  and  sung  with  "rapturous  applause,"  in  one  of  the  darkest  hours 
of  her  history. 

"Le  coq  Fran9ais  est  le  coq  de  la  gloire, 
Par  le  revers  il  n'est  point  abattu, 
II  chante  fort  s'il  gagne  la  victoire, 
Encor  plus  fort  quand  il  est  bien  battu. 
Le  coq  Fra^ais  est  le  coq  de  la  gloire 
Toujours  chanter  est  sa  grande  vertu; 
Est  il  imprudent,  est  il  sage, 
C'est  ce  qu'on  ne  peut  definir, 
Mais  qui  ne  perd  jamais  courage, 
Se  rend  maitre  de  I'avenir." 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  47 

implied  censure  it  casts  upon  our  armies  in  the  field. 
With  singular  unanimity,  we  have  urged  our  noble 
defenders  to  rush  to  the  rescue  of  the  country  in 
peril,  and  they  have  gone  forth,  men  of  all  parties, 
and  of  every  shade  of  opinion,  to  take  our  places  in 
the  great  battle.  They  at  least  have  "fought  the 
good  fight,"  with  a  single  eye  to  the  glory  and 
honour  of  their  country.  It  is  impossible  to  honour 
these  heroic  men  too  highly,  or  to  cherish  them  too 
tenderly.  While  there  is  a  spark  of  patriotism  or 
gratitude  remaining  in  our  national  life, — while  there 
is  a  sentiment  of  national  glory  or  national  honour 
left  to  preserve  us  from  that  political  decay  which 
our  senseless  discord  must  breed, — while  there  is  a 
remembrance  of  the  dauntless  valour  and  noble  self- 
sacrifice  which  characterise  the  army, — while  there  is 
a  tender  reverence  for  the  memory  of  the  martyrs 
who  have  fallen,  we  shall  shrink  from  doing  or 
saying  anything  which  may  weaken  the  faith  of  our 
soldiers  in  the  holy  cause  in  which  they  peril  their 
lives.  If  the  time  ever  comes  when  political  passions 
shall  so  blind  us,  as  to  tempt  us  to  obtain  our  ends 
by  efforts  to  demoralize  our  armies,  God  Almighty 
help  us!  for  we  shall  then  have  richly  deserved  the 
fate  which  He  has  reserved  for  the  nations  visited  in 
His  anger. 

There  are  some  whose  scruples  it  is  impossible  not 
to  respect,  who  are  lukewarm  in  the  support  of  the 
war,  because  they  think  they  see  in  certain  acts  of 
violence  done  to  those  principles  of  constitutional 


48  NORTHERN   INTERESTS   AND 

restraint  which  lie  at  the  basis  of  our  system,  a  ten- 
dency which,  if  carried  out,  would  destroy  our  bar- 
riers against  despotic  power.  To  such  men,  the 
restoration  of  the  Union,  or  the  subjugation  of  the 
South,  would  be  dearly  purchased  by  the  sacrifice  of 
the  safeguards  of  our  own  political  rights.  We 
think  all  such  fears  exaggerated,  still  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  they  exercise  a  pernicious  influence. 
No  one  who  has  been  brought  up  to  revere  the 
great  principles  of  constitutional  liberty  can  regard 
with  favour  what  is  called  "military  necessity,"  or 
raison  d1  etat,  still  it  is  clear,  that  there  are  rare 
contingencies  in  which,  like  the  law  of  self-preser- 
vation, it  must  be  invoked  and  irregularly  applied. 
No  nation  has  ever  gone  to  war  without  violating 
in  some  essential  manner  the  well-settled  rules 
which  govern  it  in  times  of  peace,  and  the  dictator- 
ship of  the  Eomans,  and  the  suspension  of  the  writ 
of  habeas  corpus,  are  only  different  ways  of  recog- 
nising the  same  great  necessity.  One  of  the  great  evils 
of  war,  is  that  it  requires  for  its  prosecution  such  a 
concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of  the  Executive 
that  there  is  very  great  danger  of  abuse  in  its  exer- 
cise. After  all,  however,  we  must  never  forget  that 
in  this  unhappy  condition  of  things  our  choice  is 
reduced  to  a  choice  of  evils.  Shall  we  submit  to  a 
temporary  despotism  now,  in  order  that  we  may  be 
saved  from  one  tenfold  more  fearful  in  the  future] 

It  is  satisfactory  to  find  that  history  does  not  show 
any  permanent  ill  effects  upon  the  attachment  of 


SOUTHERN   INDEPENDENCE.  49 

a  people  to  free  institutions,  as  the  result  of  war. 
On  the  contrary,  the  activity  and  progress  in  every 
department  which  characterize  the  present  gene- 
ration in  Europe,  can  readily  be  traced  to  the 
effects,  direct  or  remote,  of  the  wars  which  grew 
out  of  the  events  of  the  French  Revolution.  Yet, 
in  England,  good  men  and  wise  men,  despaired 
not  only  of  their  country,  but  of  the  great  cause 
of  civilization  and  liberty.  In  that  country,  "in 
the  early  part  of  the  war  with  revolutionary  France, 
if  a  man  was  known  to  be  a  Reformer,  he  was 
constantly  in  danger  of  being  arrested,  and  even 
the  confidence  of  domestic  life  was  violated;  no 
opponent  of  the  government  was  safe  under  his  own 
roof  against  the  tales  of  eavesdroppers  and  the  gos- 
sip of  servants;  not  only  were  the  most  strenuous 
attempts  made  to  silence  the  press,  but  the  book- 
sellers were  so  constantly  prosecuted,  that  they  did 
not  dare  to  publish  a  work  if  its  author  was  obnox- 
ious to  the  Court.  Indeed,  whoever  opposed  the 
government,  was  proclaimed  an  enemy  to  his  coun- 
try. Every  popular  leader  was  in  personal  danger, 
and  every  popular  assemblage  was  dispersed  either  by 
threats  or  by  military  execution."  "And  yet,"  adds 
Mr.  Buckle,  from  whose  work  we  have  taken  this 
gloomy  picture,  "  such  is  the  force  of  liberal  opinions, 
when  they  have  once  taken  root  in  the  popular 
mind,  that  notwithstanding  all  this,  it  was  found 
impossible  to  stifle  them,  or  even  to  prevent  their 


50  NORTHERN   INTERESTS,    ETC. 

increase.  In  a  few  years  that  generation  began  to 
pass  away,  a  better  one  succeeded  in  its  place,  and 
the  system  of  tyranny  fell  to  the  ground.  And  thus 
it  is  that  in  all  countries  which  are  even  tolerably 
free,  every  system  must  fall  if  it  opposes  the  march 
of  opinions,  and  gives  shelter  to  maxims  and  institu- 
tions repugnant  to  the  spirit  of  the  age.  In  this 
sort  of  contest  the  ultimate  result  is  never  doubtful. 
The  vigour  of  public  opinion  is  not  exposed  to  casu- 
alties; it  is  unaffected  by  the  laws  of  mortality;  it 
does  not  flourish  to-day  and  decline  to-morrow;  and 
so  far  from  depending  upon  the  lives  of  individual 
men,  it  is  governed  by  large  general  causes,  which 
are  in  short  periods  scarcely  seen,  but  on  a  compa- 
rison of  long  periods  are  found  to  outweigh  all 
other  considerations." 

Let  us  then,  who  have  offered  on  the  altar  of  our 
country,  our  treasure  and  the  blood  of  our  brethren, 
not  hesitate  even  to  make  a  temporary  sacrifice  of 
our  constitutional  rights,  if  the  success  of  the  great 
cause  in  which  we  are  engaged  renders  so  cruel  a 
necessity  apparent.  For  with  success  comes  peace, 
not  a  peace  which  would  prove  a  short-lived  and 
deceptive  truce,  but  a  peace  which  would  revive  in 
all  their  former  vigour  the  guarantees  of  personal 
rights,  and  which,  even  if  it  did  not  restore  the 
Union  as  it  was,  would  at  least  secure  to  us  those 
conditions  of  safety  which  are  as  the  very  life- 
blood  of  our  existence. 


a  nr 

,J\  I 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 


SJ 


3  1158  01318  7124 


